Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

11-24-2010

Summary of State v. Castaneda_swm, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 45
Sean W. McDonald
Nevada Law Journal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
McDonald, Sean W., "Summary of State v. Castaneda_swm, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 45" (2010). Nevada
Supreme Court Summaries. 299.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/299

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 45 (November 24, 2010)1
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE—INDECENT EXPOSURE
Summary
Appeal from order of dismissal of indecent exposure charges, after the district court judge
concluded the state indecent exposure statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
Disposition/Outcome
A unanimous Court reversed and remanded because the statute is neither
unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.
Factual and Procedural History
Marty Castaneda (“Castaneda”), was arrested for intentionally and repeatedly exposing
his genitals and buttocks while standing on a public sidewalk in front of the county jail in Las
Vegas. The State charged Castaneda with indecent exposure under NRS 201.220. Castaneda did
not deny the allegations, but rather challenged the constitutionality of the statute. The district
court dismissed the charges, agreeing with Castaneda‟s claims. The State appealed.
Discussion
Standard of Review
The Court reviews questions of a statute‟s constitutionality de novo. Statutes are
presumed constitutional and the party challenging a statute has “the burden of making a „clear
showing of invalidity.‟”2 Further, the Court attempts to construe a statute so as to avoid
constitutional infirmity.3
Vagueness
A criminal statute may be invalidated for vagueness for one of two independent reasons:4
(1) if it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited;” or (2)
if it “is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”5
Constitutional vagueness may be defeated when courts construe the statute in light of “the
common law definitions of the related term or offense.”6
Applying the vagueness standard, the Court held that the indecent exposure statute must
be read so as to incorporate the common law understanding of the offense, as required under
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Berry v. State, 125 Nev. ___, ___, 212 P.3d 1085, 1095 (2009) (quoting Silvar v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. 289, 292, 129
P.3d 682, 684 (2006)).
3
Virginia & Truckee R.R. Co. v. Henry, 8 Nev. 165, 174 (1873).
4
The Court noted some Nevada cases have used a conjunctive forumulation in stating the vagueness test, but stated
the tests are “independent and alternative, not conjunctive.”
5
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010) (quoting United States v.
Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008)).
6
Nelson v. State, 123 Nev. 534, 540-41, 170 P.3d 517, 522 (2007) (citing Ranson v. State, 99 Nev. 766, 767, 670
P.2d 574, 575 (1983)).
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NRS 193.050.7 The challenged statute states: “A person who makes any open and indecent or
obscene exposure of his or her person…is guilty” of a gross misdemeanor for the first offense or
a category D felony for any subsequent offense.8 The Court rejected Castaneda‟s argument that
the euphemistic use of “person” renders the statute vague. The Court relied on two District of
Columbia cases, as the District‟s statute resembles Nevada‟s.
In Duvallon v. District of Columbia, the court stated that when a statute is ill-defined the
common law definition is controlling.9 After canvassing the English common law, the court
concluded indecent exposure was limited to exposure of genitals, and thus mere exposure of the
defendant‟s buttocks was insufficient to constitute indecent exposure.10 In Parnigoni v. District
of Columbia, the defendant asserted a vagueness challenge after being charged for removing his
clothes to play nude Ping-Pong with the host‟s boy.11 The court held that Parnigoni could not
assert lack of notice given the court‟s holding in Duvallon, which defined indecent exposure to
incorporate the common law offense.12
Here, the Court concluded that Castaneda‟s had fair notice that the statute incorporates
the common law definition of indecent exposure because the Court previously held in Young v.
Statethat “indecent exposure of one‟s genitals was punishable at common law.”13 The Court also
noted that numerous other jurisdictions and authorities prohibit the intentional exposure of one‟s
“person” or “private parts.”
Ultimately, the Court held that a statute‟s reliance on “case- and common-law definitions
to establish the conduct it forbids…does not render it impermissibly vague.” The Court finally
stated that although some discretion is required to determine when genital exposure is open and
indecent or obscene, the discretion is not enough to sustain a vagueness challenge.
Overbreadth
The Court dismissed Castaneda‟s overbreadth challenge because the Court limited the
statute‟s scope to the common law prohibition against open and indecent or obscene exposure of
one‟s genitals or anus, and thus the statute does not catch a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected expressive conduct within its sweep.14
Conclusion
Nevada‟s indecent exposure statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because
it incorporates the offense‟s common law definition, limiting the meaning to open and indecent
or obscene exposure of one‟s genitals or anus.
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The statute provides “provisions of the common law relating to the definition of public offenses apply to any
public offense which is so prohibited but is not defined, or which is so prohibited but is incompletely defined.”
NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.050(3).
8
Id. § 201.220(1).
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Duvallon v. District of Columbia, 515 A.2d 724, 725 (D.C. 1986).
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Id. at 725-26.
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Parnigoni v. District of Columbia, 933 A.2d 823, 825 (D.C. 2007).
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Id. at 827.
13
Young v. State, 109 Nev. 205, 215, 849 P.2d 336, 343 (1993).
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See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1991) (plurality) (upholding enforcement of Indiana‟s
public indecency law against nude dancers and their employers).

